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What I will call the Warner-Nagel thesis is the 
claim that, even with a true and exhaustive scientific 
description of the world, we will have failed to cap-
ture a fundamental and important aspect of it: the 
qualitative character of experience. Of the two, 
Nagel's thesis is stronger. For he claims that objec-
tive science cannot capture the qualitative character 
of our experience ("facts of experience") because 
science moves away from facts which are accessible from 
only one point of view, and towards facts which are in-
tersubjective or public. 1 Since understanding what it 
is like to be an X, requires facts which are accessible 
from only one point of view, X's, the methodology of 
science is simply unsuited for the sort of understand-
ing required to capture the qualitative character of a 
thing's experiences. Hence reductionist programs were 
ill conceived from the very beginning: there is some-
thing about consciousness that cannot be captured in 
scientific accounts of the mind. 
Warner's argument does not have this ring of final-
ity about it. He concedes, for instance, that "some as 
yet unformulated form of physicalism might be true" and 
concentrates his argument on current electrochemical 
theories of the brain (and thus remains silent as to 
the inherent limitations of objective science). 1 
Warner admits, however, that in so doing he concedes 
little. His thesis is clearly that science, as far as 
we are capable of conceiving it, cannot capture the 
qualitative character of experience; and thus property 
dualism is the correct philosophical analysis of mental 
states. 
In what follows I will concentrate upon Warner's 
paper "In Defence of a Dualism" and mention Nagel's ar-
guments only as they bear upon the issues considered. 
Since, as of this writing, Richard Warner's paper 
remains unpublished, (though widely circulated and 
read), no familiarity with the paper will be assumed on 
the part of the reader. 1 In rough outline. Section 1 
of this paper details Warner's argument for the Warner-
Nagel thesis. Section 2 briefly discusses the logical 
relation between Warner's argument and Nagel's well-
known argument in "What is it Like to be a Bat."* 
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Section 3 contains direct criticisms of Warner's argu-
ment. Section 4 outlines what I take to be wrong with 
any account of property dualism, and section 5 sug-
gests relations between the Warner-Nagel thesis and 
private language. Reference is here made to Kripke's 
Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language. 
I 
I should begin by saying that, for the most part, I 
agree with the Warner-Nagel thesis. I do not believe 
that phyBicalist or functionalist theories of the mind 
capture the qualitative character of our experiences; 
nor do I think they can. I do not believe, however, 
that Warner's argument establishes this claim. And, 
most importantly, I do not believe this limitation on 
physicalism implies that we should accept either prop-
erty or substance dualism. I will, of course, say a 
good deal about this later, but the thought behind this 
assertion is the following. To understand what it is 
like to be an X requires that one instantiate a certain 
physical or functional state. But this state is not 
the state which it is like to be in when one, e.g., 
reads about an X or studies an X. Warner and Nagel un-
derstand this distinction when they tell us that read-
ing about pain (or bats) fails to help us understand 
what it is like to be in pain (or be a bat). It is 
natural to say at this point that of course the two are 
different, and why should this discrepancy constitute a 
lack of knowledge? After all, we may study black holes 
or electrons without being black holes or electrons. 
As natural as this rejoinder may be, it misses the 
point of Warner's and Nagel's argument. Their point is 
that it is not like anything to be a black hole or e-
lectron, whereas it is like something to be in pain or 
a bat. Therefore our scientific accounts of the world 
would fail to capture an important aspect of the world 
in the case of consciousness, which they would not fail 
to capture in the case of inanimate objects. With a 
true and complete theory of black holes, for instance, 
there would be nothing left to know about black holes. 
The same is not true of pain; with a true and complete 
theory of pain there would be something left to know 
about pain: how it feels. 
Having conceded this point to Warner and Nagel, 
however, I do not think we are logically forced to con-
cede that the only analysis of mind is property dual-
ism. One of the arguments presented later in the paper 
will be a refined version of the unsatisfactory rejoin-
der mentioned above. It is a contingent fact about me 
that I can only instantiate a limited range of states. 
The states I can instantiate are physical ones; my see-
ing red is a functional state which I can know what it 
is like to be in because I have instantiated the appro-
priate physical state.' And the reason a color blind 
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person cannot know what it is like to see red is not 
because the physical theory somehow fails, but rather 
because understanding a true and complete theory is not 
the same as instantiating the state of seeing red. 
What is wrong with the color blind individual has noth-
ing to do with his ability to understand a theory; it 
has to do with his inability to instantiate a physical 
state. Nagel's facts of experience, if indeed they are 
facts at all, do not point to failures in theory but to 
limitations in the contingent range of physical states 
one can instantiate. At this point, however, it is 
probably best to present Warner's argument and take up 
these matters once the Warner-Nagel thesis has been ar-
gued for. 
Warner's argument proceeds as follows. It is an 
empirical fact that there are people congenitally un-
able to feel pain. Such a person Warner refers to as 
painless. The argument then is 
(1) If pain is identical with an electrochemical 
state, then a painless person could acquire 
the ability to know nonevidentially that he 
is in pain; he could acquire this ability 
while remaining painless. 
(2) One can acquire the ability to know nonevi-
dentially that one is in pain only if one 
can feel pain. 
(3) Therefore, pain cannot be identical with an 
electrochemical or functional state. 
What Warner means by nonevidential is (1) there are 
cases where a person feels pain, or is in pain, and (2) 
no evidence other than the pain itself needs to be con-
sidered for a person to know that he is in pain. Evi-
dence for being in pain would be appropriate if it were 
possible that one should seem to be in pain when one is 
in fact not. Here Warner assumes that "pain has a cer-
tain 'qualitative character'—a certain felt quality— 
which manifests itself to one who feels pain. This 
qualitative character is such that if it seems to be 
present, it is present; and if it is present, one is in 
pain." c 
Why accept premise (1)? We imagine that the pain-
less person first reads and understands the electro-
chemical theory T which describes the state S which 
(the identity theorist claims) is identical to feeling 
pain. He learns that the electrochemical state S is 
pain. But "this Is not all he learns, for he reads a 
complete and true description of pain—that is, S. 
Nothing is left out."* In particular, he reads a de-
scription of the way pain feels. Warner's claim in 
premise (1), then, is that if the identity theory (or 
physicalism, or functional!sm) is true, the painless 
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person who reads and understands the complete and true 
description will acquire the ability to know, nonevi-
dentially, that he is in pain. This, Warner argues, 
has counterfactual content. If a painless person were, 
after reading the theory, to feel pain, he could—even 
for the first time—know nonevidentially that he was in 
pain. Warner argues for the truth of (1) by arguing 
for the truth of this counterfactual. 
His argument is this. We suppose that a painless 
(and curious) Alpha Centaurian temporarily modifies his 
central nervous system in order to induce S (a mild, 
but painful stomach cramp) in himself. "The experimen-
ter gives the nod to his assistant to flip the switch 
and immediately after that he simultaneously ex-
periences nausea and a mild, but painful stomach cramp. 
The nausea was an unforeseen consequence of the altera-
tions in his nervous system."' If the identity theory 
is true, the Alpha Centaurian must know, nonevidenti-
ally, which of the two is pain. He has a complete and 
true description of pain, even the way pain feels, so 
how can he fail to know which of the two feelings is 
pain? To say that he must know nonevidentially which 
of the two is pain Bimply means that he cannot check 
his instruments, or any other evidence other than the 
qualitative way in which each sensation feels, in de-
ciding which of the two is pain. 
The truth of the counterfactual, then, rests upon 
three assumptions. (A) T states everything there is to 
state about pain. (B) The qualitative character of 
pain manifests itself nonevidentially. And (C), from T 
the Alpha Centaurian acquires the recognitional abili-
ties necessary for correctly identifying the qualita-
tive character of pain. Thus, if the identity theory 
is true, premise (1) is true. 
I will return to these assumptions shortly. But 
first, how is premise (2) established? Warner doesn't 
argue for (2) directly; rather, he argues for the fal-
sity of the consequent of (1). Of course this would 
directly establish that pain is not an electrochemical 
state, but Warner thinks that (2) "is important; it 
is," he suggests, "the best explanation of why the con-
sequent of (1) is false."* (The logical inference in 
the argument is modus tollens.) 
Warner's argument for the falsity of the consequent 
of (1) is simple and direct. Pain manifests itself as 
having a certain qualitative character which the Alpha 
Centaurian will be ignorant of until he has the appro-
priate sort of experience. But he cannot know nonevi-
dentially which of the two experiences (pain or nausea) 
is the one which he set out to induce in himself until 
he checks his instruments. He cannot know nonevidenti-
ally that the relevant electrochemical activity is oc-
curring. The electrochemical description of pain which 
he has read and understood is the only thing about pain 
that could possibly play a role in his nonevidentially 
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knowing that he is in pain. But pain does not manifest 
itself to a pain feeler as such-and-such electrochemi-
cal activity; and in order to acquire this knowledge 
(i.e. knowledge of the electrochemical state he is in) 
he must, of course, check his instruments. Indeed, 
there is no reason to believe that, until he checks his 
instruments, he will believe either feeling to be pain. 
Thus the consequent of (1) is false. 
I believe this argument is quite correct; the Alpha 
Centaurian cannot tell which feeling is pain by virtue 
of his knowledge of T. Consider a congenitally blind 
person. With knowledge of a true and complete theory C 
for colors, the visual spectrum, optics and even such 
information as "Red looks like what a trumpet sounds 
like," there is no reason whatsoever to believe that 
the congenitally blind person could distinguish red 
from purple immediately following corrective surgery. 
I believe the reason in both cases is that neither the 
painless individual nor the congenitally blind individ-
ual has the necessary background of recognitional abil-
ities needed to make the relevant distinctions. So, if 
we are to resist Warner's conclusion, it must be 
through rejecting one or more of the assumptions made 
in establishing premise (1). 
The crucial assumption used in establishing (1) is 
(C): From T the.Alpha Centaurian acquires the recogni-
tional abilities necessary for correctly identifying 
the qualitative character of pain. (Recall, the rea-
soning here, according to Warner, is that the identity 
theory states that pain is an electrochemical state, T 
states everything there is to state concerning the 
electrochemical state of being in pain, so the Alpha 
Centaurian knows everything there is to know about 
pain.) 
But, as Warner realizes, there seems to be an ob-
vious objection to this. Isn't the ability to know 
nonevidentially that one is in pain a recognitional a-
bility that no amount of Information by itself will al-
low a suitably inexperienced person to have? Warner 
uses a person who has never seen a pomegranate to dra-
matize this point. 
Suppose a person who has never seen, say, a pome-
granate possesses a true and complete description 
of pomegranates—including a description of the 
way pomegranates appear to a normal perceiver. 
Suppose we place a pomegranate and a nectarine in 
front of the person, who as it happens has never 
seen a nectarine. There is nothing defective in 
the person'8 perceptual and reasoning faculties: 
. . . It follows that he must be able to tell 
which is the pomegranate." 
The relevant information will allow him to know which 
fruit is the pomegranate--but only if he already pos-
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sesses certain other recognitional abilities: e.g., 
the ability to recognize dark red. Given these preex-
isting abilities, he will be able to distinguish the 
pomegranate from the nectarine. The disanalogy between 
this and the Alpha Centaurian case is that the latter, 
by virtue of his previous painlessness, does not have 
the preexisting background of recognitional abilities. 
Warner'8 reply is that the Alpha Centaurian does 
not lack the necessary background of recognitional a-
bi 11 ties. We suppose that the Alpha Centaurian has the 
ability to know nonevidentially that he has a nonpain-
ful cramping feeling. When he reads T he learns that a 
cramping feeling of such-and-such intensity is a case 
of pain—where the degree of intensity is truly and 
completely described. Even the way such intensity 
feels is described. "Now how can we deny that the 
Alpha Centaurian lacks the relevant recognitional abil-
ities because he has never experienced a cramping feel-
ing of the relevant degree of intensity, . . . A per-
son who has never seen a pomegranate may never have ex-
perienced the precise color and shape that confront him 
when he sees his first pomegranate." 1 1 And this does 
not prevent him from recognizing a pomegranate when 
confronted with one. Thus, according to Warner's rea-
soning, assumption (C) should be accepted. 
II 
In outline at least, this is Warner's argument for 
the thesis that there is something that cannot be cap-
tured in materialist theories of the mind; and there-
fore, that property dualism is the correct analysis of 
mental states. It is important to point out that 
Warner's argument is sufficiently general (both in the 
scope of his premises and in the nature of his conclu-
sion) as to logically imply Nagel's thesis mentioned 
above. Warner's argument rests essentially on the as-
sumptions that pain does not manifest itself to pain 
feelers as electrochemical activity, and that it is 
possible to know nonevidentially that one is in pain. 
As Warner remarks, similar facts hold of all noninten-
tional bodily and perceptual states. If this is so, 
then we would expect Nagel's 'facts of experience' to 
be the sorts of things which can be known nonevidenti-
ally, and nonelectrochemically. And indeed this seems 
to be the case. I can know what it is like to be in 
state S only by at one time or another being in state 
S; and if S is a conscious state—which it must be if 
it is like anything to be in the state—then if I am in 
S I know it. Hence, facts of experience are known 
nonevidentially. Furthermore, facts of experience are 
known nonelectrochemically. Otherwise, I could know 
what it is like to be a bat by reading up on the sub-
ject. 
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Warner goes from facts about what a theory can and 
cannot capture to the conclusion that consciousness 
slips through the net of physicalism. There is an es-
sential bit of information or knowledge that the Alpha 
Centaurian cannot get from the electrochemical theory: 
what it is like to feel pain. Nagel, relying on more 
dubious assumptions, e.g., 'points of view', argues in 
similar fashion. What it is like to be an X escapes 
theoretical explication; hence physicalism cannot be 
the whole story. 
The point of drawing these parallels is to show 
that successful criticism of Warner is, perforce, suc-
cessful criticism of Nagel. 1* With this in mind, I now 
turn to specific criticisms of Richard Warner's argu-
ment. 
Ill 
Does the Alpha Centaurian, then, possess the neces-
sary background of recognitional abilities to know 
nonevidentially which sensation is pain? I think ob-
viously not. When Warner introduces the possibility 
that the Alpha Centaurian has experienced nonpainful 
stomach cramps, (and therefore should possess the 
required recognitional abilities), he unnecessarily ob-
scures the issue and possibly begs the question. He 
obscures the issue in that if the Alpha Centaurian has 
experienced a wide enough range of stomach cramps there 
is no reason to believe that he shouldn't be able to 
recognize the painful stomach cramp. Thus he can no 
longer truthfully be called painless, which was central 
to Warner's argument. But if we assume that the Alpha 
Centaurian, through his previous nonpainful cramps, has 
the necessary recognitional abilities, what distin-
guishes him from the individual who has never seen a 
pomegranate but yet recognizes one on first viewing? 
If the Alpha Centaurian possesses the recognitional 
abilities, as Warner insists he must, then to assume 
that he will still be unable to distinguish the two 
sensations begs the question. We might just as well 
assume that the pomegranate identification will fail. 
Rather than consider examples where the individual 
almost knows what a painful stomach cramp is, or almost 
knows what a pomegranate is, we should consider the 
case of the congenitally blind person who undergoes 
corrective surgery and is then asked to distinguish red 
from, say, purple. This is, of course, a variation of 
Molyneux s question of whether a "man born blind and 
then made to see" could determine, by sight alone, 
which of two objects was a cube and which a sphere. 
Molyneux's question is essentially whether there is a 
necessary connection between the ideas of shape, size, 
or geometric property afforded by the different modali-
ties of sight and touch. This is a much more general, 
and difficult, question than the one I am considering. 
59 
It is worth noting, however, that recent empirical evi-
dence suggests that individuals who have been suitably 
trained in solid geometry can identify which object is 
a sphere and which is a cube following corrective sur-
gery." Does the congenitally blind person, then, pos-
sess the necessary recognitional abilities to distin-
guish the two colors? Would a 'colorless' individual 
have the ability to distinguish one color from another; 
even assuming that he has the relevant theory of what 
it is like to see colors in hand? 
I think the answer must be an obvious no, he would 
not be able to distinguish the two colors. Visual a-
bilities are insufficiently like tactile or auditory a-
bi11ties to allow us to acquire knowledge of the per-
ceptual state of seeing a color--!.e., what it is like 
to see a color--from information gained from other 
sense modalities. Even explaining to the colorless 
person that some colors are cool and others warm will 
not help; these are simply generalizations based upon 
contingent correlations which we have discovered 
through seeing the appropriate colors. 
So, should premise (1), or equivalently, assumption 
(C), be rejected? The realization that the Alpha Cen-
taurian does not have the necessary background of re-
cognitional abilities is probably sufficient for re-
jecting premise (1). But I think there are even deeper 
problems with Warner's argument, and it will be in-
structive to have a look at what these problems are. 
In drawing out these problems I shall rely on 
Nagel'a phrase 'facts of experience 1 and mean by it 
conscious states, or states of which it can truly be 
said that it is like something to be in. It is like 
something to see red or feel pain. It is not like any-
thing to be a black hole or rock. Facts of experience 
are acquired through experience, not theories. For 
this reason, Warner and Nagel claim that physical!em 
cannot capture the essential features of consciousness, 
or what it is like to be an X. 
Let us look again at what the painless individual 
in Warner's example is given. He is given a true and 
complete theory of pain; nothing is left out. And (all 
agree) from this alone he cannot distinguish the two 
sensations. Therefore, the argument goes, physicalism 
cannot be the whole story. This overlooks a crucial 
point, however: he is also told what pain feels like. 
So the claim isn't that from T alone he should be able 
to distinguish the two sensations if some form of the 
identity theory is true; rather, the claim is that from 
T and a description of the way pain feels he should be 
able to distinguish the two. This is important for the 
following reason. If we take facts to be the sorts of 
things capable of being expressed by propositions, then 
facts of experience should be capable of being expres-
sed by propositions, and indeed they are. I can tell 
others what my pains are like; I can tell others what 
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it is like to be in a certain type of pain. I can even 
express this to others who haven't experienced exactly 
the sorts of pains I have. For any bodily or percep-
tual sensation S, if S bears some resemblance relation 
to S', then I can express what S is like in terms of S'. 
In order for another to understand what S is like, he 
either has to have experienced S, or S' . This is what 
we mean by the necessary background of recognitional 
abilities. For one who has never experienced a sensa-
tion sufficiently like the one 1 am trying to describe, 
my description will be meaningless. 
So, in describing to the painless person what pain 
is like, we are, in effect, looking for a S' which is 
sufficiently like what pain is like which will express 
to the painless person what we mean by pain. Warner's 
claim that if the identity theory is true the painless 
person's previous stomach cramps should enable him to 
know which of the two sensations is pain is actually a 
claim concerning resemblance relations between stomach 
cramp8 and painful stomach cramps. If these are suffi-
ciently alike, then the painless individual should have 
the necessary background of recognitional abilities. 
Similarly, what the congenitally blind person lacks is 
access to any S' which is sufficiently like the sensa-
tion of seeing red which will enable him to understand 
us when we tell him what seeing red is like. 
If the painless person, then, cannot, from T and a 
description of the way pain feels, distinguish between 
the two sensations, then it cannot solely be the fault 
of physicalism, or functionalism, or the identity theo-
ry. In fact, it isn't the fault of physicalism at all. 
We have propositions which express facts of experience, 
which tell us what it is like to feel pain, see a co-
lor, etc. But even with these, the painless person is 
unable to distinguish the sensations. By Warner's own 
admission, the electrochemical theory can be of no 
help; pain doesn't manifest itself as an electrochemi-
cal phenomenon to pain feelers. So what the painless 
person requires is some resemblance relation between 
sensations he has experienced and pain. Otherwise, 
there is simply no way for him to understand what pain 
is like. (I think this is strikingly d e a r in the case 
of the congenitally blind person.) 
Adding "If the identity theory is true, then . . . " 
to the argument changes nothing. All that the Warner-
Nagel thesis really tells us is that certain aspects of 
the world will be unintelligible to persons unable to 
understand the semantics involved in the terms we em-
ploy to describe the world. This has as little to do 
with whether we employ the terms of physicalism as it 
does with whether we employ only ' phenomenological 
terms. It is not the case that when all is said and 
done, physicalism will have failed to tell us what it 
is like to be an X. Rather, nothing apart from being 
an X, or bearing some relation to X, can tell us what 
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it is like to be an X. It is simply a fact about lan-
guage that we cannot express to the blind person what 
colors look like, or to the painless person what pain 
feels like. 
To see that the Warner-Nagel thesis cannot simply 
be a claim about the limits of physicalism vis-a-vis 
the mind-body problem, consider that even in descrip-
tions of ordinary physical objects we will have no way 
of expressing to suitably inexperienced individuals 
what the objects are like. On the level of conscious 
experience, it is presumably not like anything to be a 
computer. But we can explain to others what computers 
are like—they are like Turing machines, or they are 
like human intelligence, or they are like electronic 
digital adding machines, etc. But for someone who has 
no idea what a Turing machine is, or how human intelli-
gence might by modeled, or what digital adding machines 
do, these descriptions will be little help. (One can 
imagine, for instance, the problems an Eskimo would 
have explaining the proverbial fourteen types of snow 
to an equatorial dweller.) 
I think the general conclusion we can draw from 
these criticisms of Warner and Nagel is that there is, 
Indeed, a difference between being in a state of pain 
and reading true and complete descriptions of pain. 
And the latter yields little knowledge of the qualita-
tive nature of pain. But all this indicates is that 
there is a difference between understanding a descrip-
tion and instantiating a state. It is a contingent 
fact about us that we can only instantiate a limited 
number of states. And we cannot know a priori what it 
will be like to instantiate those states which it is 
possible for us to be in. To the extent in which this 
limits our bodily and perceptual sensations, it also 
limits our knowledge of those states which it can be 
said that it is like something to be in. But the 
states we can instantiate are physical ones. If Warner 
and Nagel insist that, necessarily, our bodily and per-
ceptual states cannot be physical states, then they 
will have to base this on something more substantial 
than the contingent fact that we cannot instantiate the 
same states as a bat. 
IV 
I now wish to discuss what I take to be wrong with 
any account of property dualism. While few philo-
sophers seriously consider substance or Cartesian dual-
ism to be a solution to the mind-body problem, property 
dualism still appears to many a legitimate alternative: 
particularly in light of the implausibility of elimina-
tive materialism and the failure of logical behavior-
ism. What I shall argue is that property dualism is 
every bit as conceptually confused as substance dual-
ism; and perhaps even more so since not only do famil-
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iar substance-property problems arise, but even more 
confounding physical substance, mental property rela-
tions arise, which are, so far as I can see, impossible 
to make any kind of sense of. 
A property dualist will, to some extent, be a real-
ist concerning mental states. "There are" Warner says, 
"feelings, thoughts, emotions, and so on, and words 
like 'pain' refer to such states." Accordingly, the 
property dualist must say that mental state terms pick 
out,or refer, to nonphysical properties of physical or-
ganisms. There is a problem in even formulating this 
claim. What does it mean when I say "I have a pain in 
my finger?" Do we take this as expressing a binary 
relation between my finger or body and an immaterial 
'pain'? Or do we understand the expression as indicat-
ing a state of my body which has a nonphysical proper-
ty? Since no one denies that I am in some physical 
state, e.g., c-fiber stimulation, when I am in pain, 
shouldn't the dualist say that it is this state which 
has the nonphysical property: the 'hurt r or the pain? 
But what of my consciousness of the pain? If the pain 
counts as a nonphysical property, surely my awareness 
of it must as well. When I use the term 'I' in making 
first person statements such as "I am aware of a pain," 
the term 'I' cannot, by the dualist's own reasoning, 
refer just to my body. If the 'I', then, must also 
refer to a nonphysical property, does this imply that 1 
am a property, that I am a nonphysical property of my 
physical body?! 
There are two replies the dualist might make to 
these charges. First, he could say that it is an acci-
dent of grammar that subject-predicate terms are used 
in the way in which they are, viz., to distinguish sub-
stance-property relations. When I say "I have a pain" 
I am not referring to a substance which has the prop-
erty of being in pain. Nor when I say "I am aware of a 
pain" do I—the dualist—mean to imply that there are 
two things going on, pain and an awareness. To have a 
pain is to be aware that one has a pain. Secondly, the 
property dualist might insist that mental properties 
are merely concomitant with physical states or events, 
like c-fiber stimulation, and that this expresses no 
more than the overall state of the organism, and fur-
thermore that this is no more mysteriovis than the fact 
that temperature is a property of a gas which expresses 
the overall mean kinetic energy of the gas molecules. 
The first of these replies is at least defensible, 
but, I think, clearly leads to a Humean bundle-theory 
of perception and serious problems with self-identity 
through time. It not only seems natural, but correct, 
to say that what individuates my perceptions, thoughts, 
and emotions is the fact that I have them. And it also 
seems correct to say that the referent of the term 'I' 
remains the same even though its properties, i.e., men-
tal states, emotions, etc., change. Thus, it does not 
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seem to be a mere 'accident1 of grammar that we use 
subject-predicate terms the way in which we do. It is 
also not clear that pain and the awareness of pain are 
one and the same state. If the property dualist wishes 
to claim this, he is committed to the incorrigibility 
of first person present tense statements, a doctrine 
many philosophers would reject. 
The real problem in formulating the property dual-
ist's position, however, arises when we consider the 
second claim: that mental properties are somehow con-
comitant with physical states (or events, or proper-
ties). Even if we grant that my awareness of my mental 
states causes the dualist no problems, the relation 
these mental states, properties, have to my physical 
body will. The first problem is obviously one of in-
teraction: how do nonphysical properties interact with 
physical ones? When 1 am aware of pain I physically 
act in certain ways; I move away from the fire, I seek 
help and medication, I desire that the pain should 
cease, and so on. But, according to the property dual-
ist, my desire and awareness are nonphysical properties 
of my physical body. Thus if they cause me to act in 
certain ways it seems we have a clear case of a physi-
cal substance causally interacting with a nonphysical 
property. And where there is energy expended and work 
done, do these nonphysical properties supply these as 
well? And wouldn't this violate our conservation laws? 
All of these objections are familiar enough. My 
reason for stating them is simply to remind the proper-
ty dualist that unless he settles for a model where 
mental states have no causal role whatsoever he will 
face the same problems as the substance dualist. The 
fact that this is so often overlooked in discussion of 
the mind requires that these objections be reiterated. 
What if the dualist continues to insist, however, 
that mental properties are merely concomitant with 
physical properties, and that no causal interaction 
takes place? This fails for two reasons. First, if 
two predicates are extensionally equivalent, and if the 
properties which they express are causally indiscern-
ible, I think we should say the predicates express one 
and the same property. On the dualist's account, the 
predicates 'pain' and 'c-fiber stimulation' are exten-
sionally equivalent: where you have one you will have 
the other. Otherwise he cannot claim that it is the 
physical property which does the interacting. Where 
there is c-fiber stimulation, there will be pain, and 
where there is pain, there will be c-fiber stimulation. 
And it will be the physical state of c-fiber stimula-
tion which causes the pain feeler to act in the way in 
which he does. Thus the predicates will be extension-
ally equivalent. Further, the properties they express 
will be causally indiscernable. The point of saying 
that the two properties were concomitant was to explain 
the causal role of the mental property—or better, to 
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explain away the causal role of the mental property. 
It cannot be the case that we will have two distinct 
properties which are constantly conjoined, as in Put-
nam's example of the temperature and conductivity of a 
metal. What leads us to say in the case of temperature 
and conductivity that we have two properties is the 
fact that they are causally discernible. Pain, how-
ever, unless it is to have a causal role independent of 
the c-fiber stimulation, will be causally indiscernible 
from the physical state it is concomitant with. If 
this convinces us that the two properties are causally 
indiscernible and that the predicates which express 
them must be extensionally equivalent, then I can see 
no reason for not maintaining that the properties are 
one and the same. 
The second problem with this formulation is that 
most dualist accounts of the mind, at least of the Des-
cartes-Kripke variety, wish to maintain that there is 
at least a logical possibility that the mind can exist 
without the body. If mental properties require con-
comitant physical properties, however, this possibility 
is lost. If pain can exist if and only if c-fiber 
stimulation exists, then we are faced with saying that 
there is not even a logically possible world where pain 
could be associated with another physical process, or 
no physical process at all. This seems a much too 
strict logical requirement on any plausible account of 
dualism: if mental properties are in fact not physical 
ones, then the logical possibility of their distinct 
existence should be maintained. As was noted, this ac-
count of property dualism fails in this respect. 
These difficulties with the dualist's position 
could be multiplied, but probably to little avail. My 
point is that however the dualist finally expresses 
what he means by saying that my pain is a nonphysical 
property, he will either encounter the same problems as 
the substance dualist, or find himself defending a po-
sition where nonphysical properties are indiscernible 
from physical ones. In either case, the conceptual and 
ontological problems seem intractable. 
V 
Finally, I wiBh to place the issues surrounding the 
Warner-Nagel thesis in larger perspective. Again, for 
the sake of argument, assume that the Alpha Centaurian, 
or the congenitally blind individual, did acquire the 
recognitional abilities needed to correctly identify 
pain or color. And they did so simply from reading the 
theory. What would we be inclined to say about this? 
I think we would have to say that they were privately 
following a rule. Consider: the Alpha Centaurian cer-
tainly feels something, just as the congenitally blind 
person certainly sees the colors following the correc-
tive surgery. This much no one disputes. The problem 
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la that neither knows how to correctly formulate and 
apply the concepts necessary to identify the qualita-
tive character of their respective experiences. And, 
as Warner formulates the problem, the only evidence 
which they are allowed is the qualitative character of 
their experiences; they must know nonevidentially which 
state they are in. So if they were able to correctly 
formulate and apply the relevant concepts it would have 
to be privately: consulting others would violate the 
nonevidential stipulation. And it does no good to 
claim, at this point, that they are allowed to consult 
the theory. Everyone agrees that pain does not mani-
fest itself as an electrochemical phenomenon. If we 
observed that they were able to formulate the concepts 
and correctly apply them, we would be forced to say 
that they were acting independently of the linguistic 
community. (For this reason, when I say "correctly ap-
plying the concepts," I do not mean that they must call 
red by what we call it. Rather, however they formulate 
and apply their concepts, their present usage must con-
form to their past intentions: their behavior must be 
rule governed.) 
As Kripke** formulates the Wittgenstein!an scepti-
cal problem which gives rise to the argument against 
private languages, what we cannot do is point to a fact 
about our past or present mental states or our external 
behavior which will guarantee that our present meanings 
conform to our past intentions. There is nothing in my 
current or past mental states which determines what I 
ought to do in the present situation. There is no-
thing, for instance, which determines that I should not 
presently mean grue when I say 'green'. The argument 
against private languages arises when Wittgenstein at-
tempts to meet these sceptical arguments. What Witt-
genstein in effect does is replace the question "What 
must be the case for this sentence to be true?" with: 
(1) Under what conditions may this form of words be ap-
propriately asserted? And (2), given (1), what is the 
role, utility, in our lives of our practice of assert-
ing this form of words under these conditions? 
What I believe most philosophers find compelling 
and true in this argument is the idea that, if consid-
ered in isolation, the notion of following a rule has 
no substantive content. Even if we do not accept the 
claim that there is nothing in our current mental 
states which determines our present intentions, I think 
we must still say that following a rule requires public 
checks upon the conditions in which the rule applies. 
If we wish to know what Jones means by 'red', we should 
not look to mental facts about Jones, but rather to the 
assertabllity conditions under which he says that some-
thing is red. This much should be clear: the argument 
is not that I cannot 'mean' anything I want by a term, 
or change it as often as I like. The argument, rather, 
is that the meaning of a term comes only through how it 
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is used. And using a term requires public criteria, if 
the term is used in a rule governed way. 
I think this has the following implications for the 
Warner-Nagel thesis. If premise (1) were true, then 
the identity theory would imply the possibility of a 
private language. If the Alpha Centaurian could, inde-
pendently of the linguistic community, formulate and 
correctly apply pain concepts then we would have a 
clear case of a rule being followed in isolation from 
any public checks on the assertability conditions for 
the term. To say that the Alpha Centaurian lacks the 
necessary background of recognitional abilities is to 
say, I would suggest, that not only does he lack the 
requisite sorts of experiences, but he lacks the re-
quisite sorts of concepts. And if applying a concept 
requires following a rule, he will never acquire the 
recognitional abilities nonevidentially. 
The private language argument also repudiates the 
claim that it is the qualitative character of our ex-
perience which constitutes our meanings. What consti-
tutes our meanings is how we use terms and the condi-
tions under which we assert them. If this is true, 
then it is not physicalism, but dualism which implies 
the possibility of a private language. Nagel and 
Warner would have us believe that there are mental 
facts about the world--facts of experience--which ne-
cessarily must be nonphysical, and that when we know 
what it is like to be an X, we know something about 
these facts. In other words, what constitutes the 
meanings of the terms used to refer to these facts of 
experience must be what it is qualitatively like to ex-
perience them. Hence, we would expect anyone suffi-
ciently acquainted with the qualitative character of, 
say pain, to be able to formulate and apply 'pain' 
concepts correctly, and do so in the absence of public 
criteria. 
Where, I would suggest, the Warner-Nagel account 
goes wrong is in treating the qualitative character of 
experience as if it were knowledge. Knowledge requires 
the use of concepts, to have a certain type of exper-
ience does not, (of course identifying an experience as 
such-and-such type requires concepts). Similarly, to 
know a fact--even a fact of experience—requires the 
application and use of concepts. To know what it is 
like to be an X, then, only makes sense as a knowledge 
claim when we can conceptually and linguistically for-
mulate propositions expressing that it is, indeed, like 
something to be an X. Understanding such propositions 
no doubt requires both the having of appropriate types 
of experiences and the understanding of appropriate 
types of concepts. This is, in part, a vindication of 
physicalist or functionalist theories of mind. For 
once the dual nature of understanding mental concepts 
is understood and appreciated it can no longer be held 
that the exclusive 'mark' of the mental is privacy and 
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incorrigibility. Public criteria must also be consid-
ered. Thus there should not be anything troublesome in 
the fact that science moves away from facts which are 
accessible from only one point of view and towards 
facts which are intersubjective and public: there are 
no facts which are accessible from only one point of 
view. 
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